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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the opportunities for a ‘just transition’ to low carbon and sustainable energy 
systems; one that addresses the current inequities in the distribution of energy benefits and their 
human and ecological costs. In order to prioritize policies that address energy poverty alleviation 
and sustainability concerns, national action and higher levels of international cooperation and 
coordination are required to steer public policy towards a broader range of public interests. This 
also implies re-directing the vast sums of private energy finance that currently serve a narrow set 
of interests. This paper considers how national and global energy governance must adapt and 
change to ensure a just transition to low carbon and sustainable energy systems. Creating a low 
carbon and sustainable energy transition will face significant challenges in overcoming 
opposition from a broad array of interest groups. The challenges of guiding a just transition are 
amplified by the relinquishing of government control over the energy sector in many countries 
and the current weak and fragmented state of global energy governance. The necessary changes 
in energy decision making will entail complex trade-offs and rebound effects that make strong, 
participatory and transparent institutional arrangements essential in order to govern such 
challenges equitably. In this respect, procedural justice is critical to achieving distributive justice 
and to creating a simultaneously rapid, sustainable and equitable transition to clean energy 
futures. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
APP Asian Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CER Certified Emissions Reduction 
CIF Climate Investment Fund 
COP Conference of Parties 
CTF Clean Technology Fund 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GDR Greenhouse Development Rights 
GEF Global Environment Facility 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IGO International Governmental Organisation 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 
JTA Just Transition Alliance 
MDB Multilateral Development Bank 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
R&D Research and Development 
REEEP Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership 
REN21 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21
st
 Century 
SREP Program to Scale-up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNEP United Nations Environment Program 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
US United States 
WWF World Wildlife Fund 
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1. Introduction
1
 
Energy is central to all aspects of human development. From cooking and heating to transport 
and lighting, energy makes modern life possible. Yet, people and places unevenly experience 
the costs and benefits of energy extraction, generation, financing, distribution, and 
consumption. This is true in terms of the economic and social benefits and harms and risks 
associated with energy as well as the environmental costs that existing patterns of energy 
production and consumption generate locally in the short term and globally in the longer 
term, most notably with respect to climate change. 
 
In today‘s global economy, energy policy is increasingly interdependent as the choices states 
make have direct consequences for other countries. These interconnections and the 
vulnerabilities they create become apparent when energy exporters chose to cut off supplies 
or regulate them in order to extract more revenue. The oil crises of the 1970s and more the 
recent interruptions in Europe‘s gas supply from Russia have heightened concerns about 
dependence on other countries for energy security. Hence through supply, price and the 
external effects of pollution generated by energy production, domestic and foreign energy 
policy are intimately linked. 
 
Pursuing energy security, alleviating energy poverty and addressing climate change 
objectives simultaneously presents a challenge of staggering proportions, not least because 
policy goals are often in tension with one another and compete for prominence. Addressing 
one can undermine efforts to achieve another. Energy security through access to secure 
supplies of fossil fuels conflicts with reducing dependence on fossil fuels necessary to tackle 
climate change. Confronting energy poverty, meanwhile, requires providing access to energy 
                                               
1 Parts of this paper draw on Mulvaney and Newell (forthcoming), Newell (2011a) and Newell (2011b). The 
authors are grateful to Alan Fuchs, Adrian Smith and Lucy Baker for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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to many millions of the world‘s citizens. But if this need is met through a huge increase in 
fossil fuel use, climate change objectives may be undermined.  
 
The challenges of addressing energy poverty in an integrated global fossil fuel economy are 
compounded by the need to tackle climate change. Attempts to balance developing countries‘ 
right to develop with the need to de-carbonise the global economy, amid calls upon many 
developed countries to pay ‗carbon debts‘ and deliver ‗climate justice‘, is generating 
significant stalemate in the climate change negotiations. Many rapidly industrialising 
developing countries continue to resist pressures to subject themselves to controls on carbon 
emissions when, on a per capita basis at least, their contribution is significantly smaller than 
that of most developed countries.  
 
The question of responsibility is, however, more complex than developed versus developing 
countries, as responsibilities and impacts are distributed unevenly within nations along the 
lines of urban/rural, rich/poor as well as cleavages such as gender, race and class (Newell 
2005). For example, China‘s plans for a vast increase in coal-fired electricity generation will 
help increase energy access to the rural poor, but to the detriment of environmental quality in 
and around the coal commodity complex. Likewise, the Three Gorges Dam will increase 
energy access to millions at the expense of those displaced by the mega-project. Inter-
generational, inter-national and intra-national trade-offs of this sort strongly characterise the 
global politics of energy and point to the importance of ‗just transitions‘ (see box 8). 
 
These dilemmas place questions of rights and justice at the forefront of efforts to pursue clean 
energy equitably. In a carbon constrained world, the challenge is meeting the energy needs 
that are most pressing in a way which significantly up-scales the role of sustainable energy 
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rather than relying on climate change accelerating fossil fuels, low carbon nuclear power, or 
large-scale hydro power. Managing the trade-offs and contradictions, identifying and meeting 
priority needs means having strong and legitimate institutions in place at all levels of 
governance that can steer the international community through the mire of entrenched 
economic and geo-political interests and temptations to privilege short term over longer term 
needs and priorities. It is only through fundamentally changing how energy policy is made 
and by and for whom that we can expect some of the distributional inequities in access and 
exposure to the consequences of unsustainable energy production and use to be addressed. 
   
The distribution of energy is shaped by an array of actors, institutions and interests whose 
actions affect international flows of energy provision and consumption, determining who 
gains access to which type of energy and on what terms. In other words, energy governance 
in the form of policies, initiatives and institutions (or lack thereof) in both the public and 
private sectors strongly shapes distribution. Patterns of uneven development pose key 
governance challenges such as providing energy to those living in poverty (energy access); 
supplying energy in a regular, fair and predictable manner (energy security); and minimising 
the environmental externalities and unequal burdens of energy extraction, provision, and 
consumption (energy and climate justice).  
 
Securing procedural justice in how decisions about energy are made by key actors in energy 
governance is, therefore vital. Decisions to allocate, use, and consume energy in particular 
ways, for particular purposes, by certain social, political and economic groups (and by 
implication to deny access to others) are mostly made out of the public eye and rarely in 
democratic forums. For reasons of commercial confidentiality when dealing with private 
companies, or because of geo-strategic sensitivities about revealing available energy supplies, 
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public participation and deliberation around questions of energy policy has traditionally been 
very weak. Consultations that provide limited or incomplete information, do not consider 
equity and impact assessments, or fail to effectively report the results of consultations, lead to 
high levels of public dissatisfaction with such processes. Even where public participation or 
comment is formally invited by the state, it often serves more to legitimate prior choices and 
decisions than to actually involve stakeholders in shaping policy choices (Lehtonen and Kern 
2009; Stirling 2009).  
 
By default, the day to day governance of energy is largely determined by producer or 
consumer (purchasing and bargaining) power where questions of justice and equitable access 
and distribution are easily marginalised in the context of market transactions. This is 
especially the case where, as in large parts of the world, states have either relinquished 
control over, or been required to liberalise parts of their energy sectors as part of power sector 
reform programmes supported or overseen by multilateral development banks that leave large 
elements of energy generation and distribution in private hands. What is particularly alarming 
is the apparent weakness and under-development of institutions of global or even regional 
energy governance: arenas in which key priorities might be set and pursued, conflicts 
identified and mediated and issues of justice and injustice handled and resolved (Florini and 
Sovacool 2009; McGowan 2009). We return to this issue below. 
 
It is against this background that this paper looks at issues of equity and justice in relation to 
the financing and governance of sustainable or ‗clean‘ energy. What counts as ‗clean energy‘ 
is itself a point of some controversy where some include low-carbon energy sources such as 
nuclear and hydro-electric power, while others reserve the term for renewable energy for 
biofuels, wind, solar, and small-scale hydro-electric (Box 1). Attention to the financing and 
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governance of clean energy in the developing world, however, implies a focus on the carbon 
markets that have been created, most significantly through the Kyoto Protocol‘s Clean 
Development Mechanism, as well as new institutions such as the Climate Investment Funds 
of the World Bank and a range of smaller scale and bilateral programs aimed at promoting 
and financing ‗clean energy‘. 
  
Ultimately a clean energy transition requires attention to the way conventional forms of 
energy and their consequences are governed and un-governed. Policy and financial support to 
fossil fuels through regulations, subsidies, tax policy, planning permission, the design of 
transport and building infrastructures, for example, have to be re-thought in a way which 
explicitly privileges support for, and improves access to, clean energy. In other words 
providing additional support to clean and renewable energy is to be welcomed; but it will 
ultimately be ineffective in improving energy security and tackling energy poverty and 
climate change unless it moves away from a system of energy production and distribution 
characterized by political instability, volatile commodity prices, uneven access, and which 
accelerates climate change. 
 
The paper will look then at both the procedural and distributional elements of equity and 
justice: who participates, is represented and sets the rules by which governance institutions in 
this area operate and what impacts this has on who gets access to clean and sustainable 
energy, how and on what terms. Questions of equity and justice need to be resolved not just 
in intergovernmental proposals on ways in which to allocate responsibility for tackling 
climate change or how to deliver action on energy poverty (though this latter issue has 
received considerably less attention), but also in governments‘ national level responses: 
where the burden falls, who pays and who decides. The paper is divided in the following 
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way. Section 2 looks at distributional issues, focusing in turn on energy access, energy 
security and then the relationship between energy and climate justice. Section 3 looks at 
procedural issues in relation to institutions of energy finance and institutions of climate 
governance. Section 4 concludes and suggests key issues that need to be addressed if the 
pursuit of clean energy is to occur in an equitable way. 
 
 
Box 1: What counts as clean energy? 
Clean energy tends to refer to non-conventional, non-fossil fuel sources of energy and 
can include a range of energy sources from nuclear and hydro energy and biofuels to a 
range of renewable energies such as wind, solar, geothermal, tidal power and biomass. 
But it can, under some definitions, refer to ‗cleaner‘ fossil fuels such as ‗clean coal‘ or 
low carbon energy sources such as nuclear power.  
  
Definitions of ‗renewable energy‘ are also often ambiguous. According to the World 
Bank, ‗new renewable energy‘ applies to energy from biomass, solar, wind, geothermal 
and small hydro (under 10MW). However, the term ‗renewable energy‘ can include 
energy efficiency measures and large hydro-electric projects.  
 
For further discussion of definitions see WWF-UK (2008).  
 
 
2. Distributional issues 
Vast inequalities characterise questions of access and use of energy. These inequalities are 
apparent between regions and countries but also reveal significant gender, racial and class 
characteristics such that energy is often a powerful indicator of poverty and social exclusion 
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in general. As such, the distribution of energy cannot be considered in isolation of other 
aspects of energy poverty and political and social marginalisation.    
 
Global comparisons of per capita energy use allude to the level of inequality in energy use 
(Figure 1) and several authors have highlighted the relationship between basic energy 
consumption and human development (e.g. Gaye 2007; Practical Action 2010). Disparities 
are partly explained by differential coverage of electricity grids and by patterns of energy 
consumption. North American primary energy consumption for example is around twelve 
times that of Africa (EIA 2006). Focusing on residential consumption, the IEA draws a 
comparison between the roughly equal consumption of electricity by the 19.5 million 
residents of New York state (2,050 kWh per capita per annum) and the 791 million residents 
of sub-Saharan Africa
2
 (52 kWh per capita) (IEA, UNDP & UNIDO 2010).  
 
                                               
2 Excluding South Africa 
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Figure 1. Regional disparities in energy use
3
 
 
Source: based on IEA Statistics, accessed through World Bank Data 
(http://data.worldbank.org). Data from Central Asia is unavailable for the period pre-1990. 
 
 
However, global comparative statistics tell only part of the story of unequal energy access 
and its impacts. Total energy consumption does not reflect the greater efficiency of energy 
use in OECD countries, compared to inefficient use of biomass
4
, which generates less useful 
energy for users.  Aggregate figures and country comparisons can also mask significant 
disparities in energy access within countries, which can be as large as those between 
developing and industrialised nations (Siddiqi 1995). This disparity is most visible between 
income groups within countries and between urban and rural areas, where settlements are 
more sparsely populated, electricity grid extension is expensive, energy transport costs are 
high and few incentives exist for public investment or private investment in energy. 
                                               
3 Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels 
4 It should be noted however that the efficient and sustainable use of biomass has many potential advantages for 
developing countries, including local accessibility, low carbon emissions over long time frames and potentially 
labour intensive supply chains capable of job creation (Macqueen & Korhaliller 2011) 
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Meanwhile poor urban consumers typically spend a greater proportion of their income on fuel 
and electricity, which can limit their energy consumption. 
 
The impacts of differentiated energy access to energy services are also felt at the household 
level. Women generally suffer a disproportionate burden from the time and energy spent 
collecting fuelwood and the detrimental health effects that can result from labour. Because of 
the time spent on domestic activities, women and children are also at higher risk of suffering 
the effects of indoor air pollution as a result of inefficient combustion of fuelwood, estimated 
by the World Health Organisation to be responsible for 1.45 million premature deaths each 
year (greater than those attributed to tuberculosis and malaria) and set to increase between 
today and 2030 (WHO 2008; cited in IEA, UNDP & UNISO 2010). 
 
Because of the vast inequalities in energy consumption it is estimated that meeting the basic 
energy needs outlined in the following section of those without access to modern energy 
would require around 1.2 per cent of current world total energy consumption (Sanchez 2010: 
11).
5
 
 
2.1 Energy Access 
Access to energy is a prerequisite for poverty reduction and human development as modern 
energy services are essential to meet basic and productive needs. Energy is critical for basic 
needs such as lighting, water procurement, cooking and water heating, space heating and 
cooling, modern medical services, information and communications and transportation. 
Modern energy services are also essential to economic development. Without reliable sources 
                                               
5 This percentage is derived from estimates for cooking using an average of 35 kg of biomass per capita per year 
(equivalent to 432 kWh of electricity) which should be sufficient for cooking all meals and about 120 kWh of 
electricity per capita per year which should be sufficient to provide lighting, access to most basic services and to 
add value to production (Sanchez 2010:11).  
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of energy industries cannot develop, vicious cycles of poverty persist, and the health impacts 
of traditional energy resources linger. It is unsurprising then that confronting the challenge of 
energy poverty is central to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 1.4 billion people 
in the poorest regions of the world still have no access to electricity and under most scenarios 
1.2 billion people – mostly in rural areas – will still lack access to electricity in 2030 (IEA, 
UNDP and UNIDO 2010). Worldwide, 2.7 billion people rely on traditional biomass for 
cooking and heating and another billion have access only to unreliable electricity networks 
(IEA, UNDP and UNIDO 2010). According to the report, the Millennium Development 
Goals in general, and specifically the goal to halve extreme poverty by 2015, cannot be 
achieved without new policies specifically designed to address energy poverty. The 
systematic neglect of the issue of global energy poverty by policy-makers (Sanchez 2010) has 
led activists to use the language of ‗injustice‘ to describe this scenario, even invoking the 
language of ‗apartheid‘ to highlight the stark inequalities in energy use (Corbyn 2010). This 
makes the target of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Group on Energy and Climate 
Change (AGECC) for universal energy access by 2030 a bold one indeed. 
 
Box 2: ‘Smart’ and ‘Just’ Grids  
 
‗Smart grid‘ concepts, systems, and technologies are intended to intelligently integrate 
electricity generation, transmission, and consumption. The term is meant to contrast with 
the more crude and unidirectional electricity delivery infrastructure, where there are 
significant inefficiencies in matching electricity supplies from power plants to uneven and 
constantly changing consumption patterns. Smart grids can maximise efficiency through 
the integration of devices that can reduce transmission losses, shift peak demand, and 
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improve the quality of energy delivered. While smart grids remain in early phases of 
development, these innovations may make important contributions to alleviating energy 
poverty and avoiding the uneven outcomes of many electrification policies in 
developing countries to date by reorienting the organisation of energy systems. 
 
The notion of Just Grids has been introduced to reflect the need for power systems to 
contribute towards equitable and inclusive global, economic and social development. The 
concept can be a useful design element for an energy policy that provides universal access 
to reliable, affordable, and sustainable electricity, without marginalising the poor. A key 
consideration in developing ‗smart and just grids‘ is that it implies decentralisation of 
storage and generation sources, as well as bidirectional electricity flows. These features 
make it easier to integrate smaller-scale, intermittent, and sometimes remote renewable 
energy systems such as solar and wind. It is possible that less centralised systems offer 
more opportunities for control over energy infrastructure as well. 
 
In contrast, some approaches to electricity modernisation remain highly centralised. An 
effort in North Africa called the DESERTEC Concept for Energy, Water and Climate 
Security (DESERTEC 2009), while ostensibly offering some benefits to local 
communities, plans to use elements of smart grid technologies that increase grid 
transmission efficiency and stability to export solar energy to Europe. Thus smart grids are 
not inherently just. But the notion of smart and just grids can be an important concept to 
consider justice and equity in efforts to tackle energy poverty and climate change. 
 
Source: Bazilian et al. (2011) 
 
13 
 
 
2.2 Energy Security 
Uneven energy access is also of course a product not just of mal-distribution within countries, 
but also between them.  Energy sources are unevenly distributed globally and some energy 
flows create important vulnerabilities and pose threats to energy security. Global and 
domestic energy politics are intimately connected and are often played off against one 
another. Energy insecurity is a common justification for increased domestic energy 
production, or outright energy sovereignty to reduce dependence on imports from areas of the 
world characterised by conflict or political instability. It also justifies securing future energy 
flows from foreign sources (Sudan‘s mortgaging of future oil supplies to China is a case in 
point or use of land grabs to cultivate biofuels).  
 
Energy security is not just about the international relations of geo-political security and 
competition for influence, though the number of contemporary wars fought over access to oil 
suggests this continues to be a dominant feature. In/security is also produced by the everyday 
practices of exploration, extraction and distribution. Clear examples of conflicts and 
contradictions between energy security and human rights are found throughout the global 
fossil fuel economy leading some to claim that nations awash in energy and natural sources—
particularly those who rely heavily on these exports for foreign exchange earnings—are 
prone to suffer from a resource curse (Ross 2002). For example, securing Nigerian sweet 
crude oil often involves dispatching paramilitaries in the Niger Delta to protect oil 
infrastructure. Local communities often attempt to secure their own energy needs by 
rupturing pipelines. The injustices of petro-violence and human rights abuses perpetuated by 
petro-states are well known features of the global oil commodity complex (Watts 2005). Such 
examples highlight the fact that, in the case of energy, state interests are often poorly aligned 
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with those of marginalised groups who remain deprived of energy or whose land is home to 
oil, for example, which places their livelihoods in the path of lucrative state and private 
revenue. Conflicts between indigenous groups and the state, acting on behalf of state-owned 
and multinational enterprises, in many parts of the world illustrate this dynamic clearly. 
 
The thirst for affordable and reliable energy resources is also the basis of land grabs for 
energy. The spatial restructuring of energy supply will be a necessary condition of clean 
energy transitions, due to the lower power density of renewable energy versus the 
concentrated energy in fossil fuel deposits (Smil 2005). But the environmental and 
socioeconomic impacts of new approaches to energy supply will be mediated by the existing 
power of different groups over resources previously not highly valued by the energy industry. 
For example, the increased reliance on electric vehicles will set in motion a land grab for 
territories with newfound value such as the Altiplano in Bolivia, where there are vast deposits 
of Lithium (Romero 2009). Some have gone so far as to say that foreign oil dependency will 
simply be replaced with a dependency on other imported materials, producing new forms of 
energy insecurity. 
 
Efforts to secure energy might include land acquisitions by wealthy countries to meet rising 
energy demands, with implications for intra-national equity when considering the 
dependency of the rural poor on primary production for livelihoods. The history of biofuels 
development provides examples of how attempts to address energy insecurity produce 
patterns of injustice in their wake. Brazil transformed itself from an oil importer to an 
exporter, and is self reliant in fuel for passenger cars from sugarcane ethanol. A program 
implemented in the 1970s increased sugarcane production and mandated that new cars have 
flex fuel engines to run on ethanol. It was strong and coherent policy that fostered this 
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technological transformation. But the industry is confronted with accusations of slave and 
child labour in poor working conditions.  The US is trying to mimic this model of energy 
security by increasing ethanol production mainly from corn, on which approximately 40 per 
cent of US clean energy subsidies are currently estimated to be spent (New Energy Finance 
2010). But some civil society groups—Friends of the Earth, Union of Concerned Scientists, 
and Greenpeace among others—contend that corn ethanol exacerbates food insecurity 
(Naylor et al. 2007). In 2008, the demand for biofuels contributed to rising prices for corn, 
leading to ‗tortilla riots‘ by campesino groups in Mexico for whom the crop is a food staple.  
 
In an integrated but highly unequal global economy, ‗boomerang‘ effects abound in the 
global politics of energy. The same is true for the externalities generated by the production 
and consumption of energy, regionally with respect to issues such as air quality and acid rain 
and globally regarding climate change. This is what makes integrated and multi-dimensional 
approaches to energy security, of the sort proposed by the World Economic Forum (see Box 
3), so crucial. 
 
Box 3: A more useful definition of energy security? 
 
The World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Energy Security defines energy 
security in an inclusive way as: 
‘the reliable, stable and sustainable supply of energy at affordable prices and at an 
acceptable social cost’.  
This does not get round the issue of who defines ‗sustainability‘, ‗affordability‘ or ‗social 
cost‘ but expanding the conceptualisation of energy security suggests one way of showing 
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how the goals of tackling energy poverty, improving energy security and responding to 
climate change are intimately interlinked. 
 
Source: World Economic Forum (2010; emphasis added) 
 
2.3 Energy and climate justice 
Drastic changes in energy production and consumption will be required to confront the 
challenges of climate change and re-orient the global economy on a low carbon footing. But 
such transitions raise issues of energy and climate justice. Start with the amount of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) permitted in the atmosphere. International climate negotiations 
debate whether to aim for climate stabilisation at 450 parts per million carbon dioxide levels, 
or 350 parts per million, levels that some climate scientists contend will be necessary to 
protect the survival of small island nations from sea level rise (but which latest IEA figures 
suggest we already look set to surpass (IEA, 2011)). Questions of who gets to use what type 
of energy in a carbon-constrained world raise issues of energy justice in the form of 
responsibility (current versus historical) and entitlement (whose needs are most pressing and 
who decides who can emit how much). Various climate change policy proposals have sought 
to address these issues, each placing a different weighting on issues of equity, efficiency, and 
effectiveness, in terms of the ability to most rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Proposals include ‗contraction and convergence‘, an idea promoted by the Global Commons 
Institute and supported by many developing nations (Meyer 2000). This framework aims to 
‗contract‘ overall carbon emission safely below the threshold to avoid runaway climate 
feedbacks and keep warming within tolerable limits. At the same time overall per capita 
carbon emissions would ‗converge‘ by redistributing emissions entitlements. Others, such as 
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the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR) framework, developed by a coalition of NGOs 
and research organisations, seek to reconcile the right to development with the need to 
drastically reduce emissions on the basis of a formula which incorporates population, GDP 
and cumulative emissions contribution (Kartha et al. 2009). Different justice principles are 
invoked in each. Proposals based on ‗grandfathering‘, favoured by the US, take the status quo 
as the most legitimate starting point while seeking to maximise the utility of current 
generations, whereas contraction and convergence and GDR proposals place intra and inter-
generational equity principles more centrally and give different weight to the social and 
economic benefits accrued from historical emissions. 
 
The question, however, is not just how to allocate rights to development in a carbon-
constrained world or how to ensure a ‗just‘ transition away from fossil fuels towards cleaner 
and more sustainable forms of energy production as discussed below (section 3.6). 
Technological and market-based ‗clean energy‘ solutions to climate change also have the 
potential to impact upon energy justice. Civil society groups such as Green For All and the 
Blue-Green Alliance (a coalition between the US Steel Workers Union and the Sierra Club 
among others) look to promote a clean energy agenda that can create jobs for the urban poor, 
aiming for a just distribution of benefits from a new green economy. But the burdens of this 
transition could be uneven as well. For example, the manufacture of solar photovoltaic 
modules, compact fluorescent lights or biofuels, as we saw above, may reproduce the unequal 
occupational health and environmental pollution burdens found in analogous industries. 
There is a tendency to treat all clean energy technologies as homogenously ‗green‘. Yet, solar 
photovoltaic technologies rely on semiconductor technologies built out of hazardous 
industrial chemicals, complex global supply chains, and contract manufacturing (Silicon 
Valley Toxics Coalition 2009). The legacy of environmental injustice in the wake of the 
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semiconductor manufacturing in the 1970s and 80s—toxic waste sites and occupational 
health problems in mostly immigrant women workers—reminds us that all commodities 
come at unequal costs (Pellow and Park 2002). 
 
The pursuit of clean energy, such as wind energy, through projects supported by carbon 
finance under the Kyoto Protocol‘s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), has led to 
struggles over land and the distribution of revenues derived from the carbon credits in India 
for example (Böhm and Dabhi 2010). In scenarios such as this, new funding streams in 
support of action on climate change can end up entrenching procedural inequalities in local 
decision-making around access to land and livelihoods where climate and carbon revenue 
streams compete with, and sometimes take priority over, other potential uses of land. Similar 
tensions over land allocation have arisen in developed countries such as the UK, US and 
Denmark over land allocation for wind turbines and the distribution of financial returns from 
the sale of electricity, with different levels of support from private companies, government 
and local communities dependent on their involvement in project and policy design and the 
distribution of financial returns (Barry et al 2008; Phadke 2011).  
 
In relation to the discussion above, one of the key challenges is how to reconcile efforts to 
tackle energy poverty and climate change simultaneously. To take a concrete example, the 
controversial use of World Bank climate funds to support the construction of the Medupi 
coal-fired power plant in South Africa illustrates these tensions at work
6
. The argument was 
made that the World Bank‘s mandate to tackle energy poverty meant lending support to 
large-scale infrastructural projects (rather than off-grid renewables), while supporting cleaner 
                                               
6 Once completed, South Africa‘s 4.8GW Medupi coal fired power station will be one of the largest in the 
world, generating an estimated 25 million tonnes of carbon dioxide per year. In April 2010, the World Bank 
approved a $3.75 billion loan to the project based on the use of ‗clean‘ supercritical boiler technology. The 
USA, UK and, The Netherlands, Italy and Norway registered their opposition to the loan by abstaining on the 
World Bank vote. 
19 
 
forms of coal ensured this occurred is a less carbon intensive way. The World Bank‘s 
ambitions to serve as a key institution of climate finance were certainly damaged by offering 
such large scale support to conventional fossil fuel projects. Moreover, critics have contested 
claims that the project will relieve energy poverty, arguing that without a realignment of the 
priorities of the South African power sector additional coal-based capacity would mainly 
benefit large-scale industry rather than poor consumers. Similar issues have arisen in other 
contexts, with debates over the use of climate finance to fund Concentrated Solar Power 
installations in the Moroccan Atlas Mountains that  plan to export a significant proportion of 
their generation capacity to the European Union. 
 
Debates over financing for the Medupi plant have occurred alongside consultations over the 
World Bank‘s new Energy Sector Strategy, which will guide its global energy sector lending 
for the next decade. Reaction to an April 2011 draft version of the strategy again indicated 
the tensions in institutional responses to energy poverty and climate concerns and the 
contested links between procedural and distributional justice. Plans in the draft strategy to 
end financing for coal-based generation in Middle Income Countries have drawn heavy 
criticism from the governments of emerging economies, who highlight both the historical 
responsibility for carbon emissions in nations with the largest representation at the World 
Bank and the continued financing of new coal generation in those countries.  At the same 
time critics maintain that loopholes in the strategy allow significant further funding for coal 
in low income countries that risks locking the poorest energy users into a high carbon energy 
future.  So-called ―clean coal‖ technologies such as Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) 
may eventually allow some sequestering of carbon emissions, but requires 30 per cent more 
coal use for the same amount of energy (Ansolabehere et al. 2007). It is not clear what 
increased coal demand will mean for Appalachian communities near mountain top removal 
20 
 
sites for instance, or for those employed along the coal commodity chain at power plants, or 
in mining. Recent coal mining disasters in West Virginia, New Zealand, China, and Peru 
illustrate, however, how coal‘s cheapness comes at a tremendous human cost. Clean coal 
technology could make more common occurrences of fly ash slurry spills like the one that 
inundated a community in Tennessee in December 2008 with arsenic, cadmium, lead and 
mercury (Guarino 2008). Ironically fly ash ponds are a by-product of clean air regulations 
that require pollution abatement, showing how even good intentions (clean air) simply shifts 
environmental risks elsewhere (communities downstream of coal power plants). These risk 
reallocations rarely receive public vetting or necessary scrutiny, sometimes simply because 
they are unanticipated or unintended. 
 
In the past competing conceptualisations of justice have variously condemned, justified 
(particularly from utilitarian perspectives) and ignored the geographically and socially 
differentiated impacts of energy production. What becomes clear is that the transition to a 
low carbon economy will not be free from a similarly uneven distribution of burdens, 
particularly if low carbon energy is pursued without attention to energy justice and 
sustainability. Highlighting the social and environmental externalities and impacts associated 
with the production of any energy form, whether fossil-fuel based or not, is not grounds for 
rejecting a role for that energy source as part of a balanced mix. Our point in raising these 
issues is to emphasise, as we do much more fully in section 3 below, the importance of 
having adequate decision-making processes in place to ensure that the inevitable trade-offs in 
terms of energy policy choices (how to balance access and supply with cost and 
sustainability- and effects- who wins and who loses from different energy pathways and how 
a transition from one pathway to another) are managed in as equitable and just a manner as 
possible. It does, however, underline the importance of politics to pursuing clean energy 
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equitably and gives cause for scepticism about the abundance of simple win-win solutions for 
tackling energy in a highly unequal world.  
 
2.4 Governing Energy Finance 
The landscape of energy finance has altered drastically in recent years and continues to face a 
series of challenges regarding sourcing of and access to finance, predictability of flows and 
mechanisms of distribution. As the IEA (2009) notes, the financial crisis has made it more 
uncertain whether the levels of energy investment needed to meet long term energy needs can 
be mobilised. Finance is clearly central to the energy policy decisions discussed above and 
could therefore play a key role in redressing existing inequalities. Based on a broad definition 
of clean energy
7
, New Energy Finance estimate that  new worldwide clean energy 
investments in 2010 totalled $243 billion (BNEF 2011), up 30% from the previous year, 
when capital markets were still experiencing repercussions. However new clean energy 
investments remain relatively small in relation to the broader economy and financing for new 
clean power generation remains lower than that for non-renewable sources (including large 
hydropower) (UNEP SEFI 2010). Clean energy finance is also unevenly distributed across 
sectors, technologies and countries. The global growth in new energy finance has mostly 
been focused in China, which saw growth of 30%, and in wind power, which received a 31% 
increase in investment, mostly due to Chinese onshore and European offshore installations 
(BNEF 2011). In contrast, energy finance investments in sub-Saharan Africa have been 
negligible. Figure 2 shows the uneven distribution of new investment during 2009 from the 
financial sector, which is doing little to overcome existing inequalities in energy access. Of 
$40.8 billion invested in Asia & Oceania, $33.7 billion took place in China. 
                                               
7 Alongside renewable energy sources (bioenergy, geothermal, wind and solar) the BNEF definition of clean 
energy includes energy efficiency measures as well as nuclear and carbon capture and storage technologies, 
which are excluded from many other definitions of clean energy.  
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Figure 2. Financial new investment in renreable energy 
by region in 2009 ($ billions)  
 
Source: UNEP SEFI (2010) 
 
 
The capital needed to meet projected energy demand through to 2030 amounts in cumulative 
terms to US$26 trillion or US$1.1 trillion per year (1.4 per cent of global GDP). Half of this 
energy investment is needed in non-OECD countries. At the same time, advocates for pro-
poor energy policies suggest that the funding needed to provide universal basic energy access 
is less than three per cent of global energy investment to 2030 and would add little to global 
carbon emissions (Practical Action 2010). To stabilise concentrations of greenhouse gas 
emissions at 450 parts per million requires an additional investment of US$10.5 trillion 
globally in the energy sector in the period 2010-2030. The energy sector in non-OECD 
countries would need around US$200 billion of additional investment in clean energy and 
efficiency by 2020. While mitigation costs in developing countries could reach US$140-175 
billion a year by 2030, current flows of mitigation finance averaging US$8 billion a year to 
2012 pale in comparison (World Bank 2009b). Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
meanwhile is less than ten per cent the size of foreign direct investment flows in the energy 
sector. At around $10.7 billion, recent levels of energy-related ODA have been far from 
23 
 
sufficient: with less than half of the total distributed to low-carbon energy (See the HDR 
Financing paper).The scale of the challenges is immense. 
 
Private financial flows in the energy sector increasingly outstrip those in the public sector. 
Because some clean energy firms are at the frontiers of innovation, clean technology attracts 
venture capital investors looking for disruptive technologies. Estimates of annual investments 
in clean tech wax and wane with larger financial trends, but in recent years has as high as 
$11.3 billion annually (Pew Environment Group 2010). Venture capital is led by the US, and 
led by the biofuels, solar energy, energy efficiency, and smart grid industries. Many venture 
capital-based projects do not make it across the so-called ‗valley of death‘ because they do 
not have the substantial capital requirements needed to reach scale. One trend to secure clean 
technology finance has been through merging with or being acquired by multinational energy 
companies, with easier access to more and cheaper credit. One innovative means of 
distributing the financial risks of investing in the clean technology space is the US 
Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program. This program has provided more than $30 
billion for clean energy projects such solar power plants, biomass refineries, and wind farms 
(DOE 2011). The program is attractive for companies seeking large capital infusions because 
the government agrees to pay the loan if the company becomes insolvent, and in some cases 
will pay the costs of administering the loan. While this has led to important clean technology 
investments, some have questioned the administration and oversight of the program (GAO 
2010). 
 
While private finance and investment is to some extent governed by trade and investment 
rules, it often lies beyond the reach of systems of energy and environmental governance at the 
international level, such as they exist. For reasons of economic and energy security, ensuring 
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growth while tackling energy poverty and addressing climate change, it is increasingly 
important that governments and international institutions are able to shape private financial 
flows in the energy sector. 
 
One way that governments already shape energy investment is through energy subsidies for 
producers and consumers. Recent renewed attention to the environmental damage and 
economic cost of fossil fuel subsidies has lead to commitments from G20 countries to work 
towards fossil fuel subsidy reform. The IEA has estimated that direct subsidies encouraging 
wasteful consumption totalled $312 billion in 2009 (IEA 2010). Including indirect subsidies 
such as tax credits and deductions or the transfer of risk to governments inflates the estimated 
figure to $557 billion, although in most cases indirect subsidies are so diverse and lacking in 
transparency that it is highly challenging to make meaningful estimations. The IEA also 
estimates that elimination of fossil fuel subsidies by 2020 could cut expected growth in 
energy demand by over five per cent and various estimates suggest that energy related GHG 
emissions could be reduced by 6% by 2020 or as much as 13 per cent by 2050 (see Ellis 
2010; IEA 2010). But with most of the increase in energy demand projected to occur in non-
OECD countries, the equity impacts of subsidy reform are likely to be significant. 
 
Yet fossil fuel subsidies have survived against a strong macroeconomic case for their removal 
for some time (IEA, OECD and World Bank 2010). Once created, energy subsidies are 
notoriously difficult to change due to the investments and interest groups that form around 
them. Victor (2009) argues that fossil fuel subsidies are so pervasive not only because of the 
demand from well organised interest groups, but also because they provide governments a 
readily available mechanism of supply; one that requires very little in the way of 
administrative capacity or long term planning. Governments face challenges of coordination 
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across parts of governments that may have power over energy subsidies and those that may 
administer potential redistribution, equity-focused or clean energy policies, each subject to 
differing political forces and influences. 
 
However, in contrast to the environmental and economic case for fossil fuel subsidy reform, 
the trade-offs involved in the political redistribution of end-user subsidies are more complex 
and less well understood (Ellis 2010). While many consumer subsidies are poorly targeted 
and subject to capture by non-poor groups, there will be inevitable trade-offs and socially 
differentiated effects of any subsidy reform. For example, consumer subsidies for diesel fuel 
in India were originally designed to supply farmers with low cost fuel for agricultural 
production but have more recently benefited owners of four wheel drive vehicles, subsidising 
luxury consumption at the expense of very real needs for below cost-price energy of much of 
the rural population (Bandyopadhyay 2010). Many calls for fossil fuel subsidy reform 
however are not driven by concerns for equity in energy access, and the distribution of 
economic, environmental and social outcomes of reforms are likely to reflect the balance of 
power in decision making. These issues could also be expected to influence discussions and 
negotiations over appropriate governance arrangements for international institutional 
leadership and coordination of long term subsidy reform (Lang et al. 2010). To make energy 
subsidies work for the public interest, energy access and equity must be central to reforms of 
fuel subsidies. This means not only creating appropriate, time-bound subsidies to nurture 
clean technologies but also emphasising the social impact of fossil fuel subsidy reform and 
the possibility of just outcomes. 
 
Critics of the CDM also highlight the large sums of carbon finance that have been transferred 
to fossil fuel projects and industrial gas projects under the new carbon finance mechanisms – 
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effectively subsidising fossil fuel and commercially viable large hydroelectric power projects 
and diverting funds from clean energy projects (Haya 2007). Design problems and industrial 
lobbying in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme has also resulted in windfall 
profits for major European emitters following the free allocation of emissions permits based 
on historical emissions (Gilbertson and Reyes 2009). Nor are subsidies for ‗clean energy‘ 
equal. Debates over which clean energy technologies to prioritise and support are shaped by 
diverse policy environments and domestic framings of energy, but particularly notable is the 
renewed attention in some countries to nuclear power as a potentially ‗clean‘ source of 
energy with which to replace existing baseload electricity generation from coal. Nuclear 
power (as well as hydroelectricity) has required significant advanced investment and 
consistent public subsidies over several decades in order to become an established 
technology, whereas clean technologies approaching commercial status at a time of broadly 
market-orientated energy policy face significant challenges to compete on equal terms 
(Stirling 2009). OECD data suggests that significant sums of energy-related ODA also 
support hydroelectric power, followed by nuclear and solar sources (see the HDR Financing 
Paper). 
 
2.5 Distribution of carbon market finance 
In comparison to the volume of finance required for such transformative change in global 
energy systems, the current level of finance for clean energy projects in the developing world 
generated by carbon markets is relatively small, but is significant nonetheless. CDM revenues 
constitute the largest source of mitigation finance to developing countries to date (World 
Bank 2009b). However, to date there is a weak poor relationship between the incidence of 
energy poverty and the flows of carbon finance, which make it highly questionable whether 
carbon markets have made a significant contribution to the alleviation of energy poverty. The 
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value of the Clean Development Mechanism by 2009 is estimated at $2.6 billion (Kossoy and 
Ambrosi 2010), but rather than funding clean energy projects, around three quarters of carbon 
credits had gone to the elimination of industrial gases by large manufacturing firms, mostly in 
China (figure 3).  
 
Although they have received fewer funds, renewable energy projects make up around sixty 
per cent of CDM projects. However, the distribution of carbon finance for renewable energy 
has been highly uneven. Perhaps unsurprisingly, CDM investment has flowed to countries 
with a low risk investment and regulatory landscape, a favourable economic environment and 
with existing institutional links and social relations among investors that have also played a 
role in shaping the growth of the market (Pulver and Benney 2010). As such, carbon finance 
has tended to shadow flows of foreign direct investment to middle income countries such as 
China and India, which between them have received over 70 per cent of CDM revenues 
(figure 4), although the level of local financing in Indian and Chinese projects suggests the 
national financing capacity of these countries is also a significant driver of projects. In 
contrast, only one per cent of CDM investment has gone to sub-Saharan African countries. 
Notwithstanding efforts to index CDM project distribution to factors such as economy size 
and emissions mitigation potential (Lütken 2011), the CDM has thus far failed to direct 
notable energy investment to the poorest countries.  
 
Although a middle income country, India also has significant internal inequalities, with over 
400 million people without access to electricity and over 850 million people relying on 
biomass for cooking (OECD/IEA 2010). The distribution of carbon finance for clean energy 
within countries such as India – and to a lesser extent China – has also been highly uneven 
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(figure 5) and appears to reflect more complex local and national governance factors than 
simple state/province income or the sub-national flow of FDI (Newell et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 3. CDM Carbon Credits (CERs) by host country 
 
Source: Compiled from data in UNEP RisØ (2011a) 
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Figure 4: The global distribution of carbon finance for renewable energy has been 
concentrated in a few Asian countries, mostly China and India. 
a) CDM renewable energy projects by host region 
 
 
b) CDM renewable energy projects by host country 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled from data in UNEP RisØ (2011a) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The distribution of clean energy carbon finance has also been uneven within host 
countries 
a) Indian CDM renewable energy projects by state 
 
 
b) Chinese CDM renewable energy projects by province 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled from data in UNEP RisØ (2011b) 
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The voluntary carbon market remains modest in size despite remarkably rapid initial growth. 
At $387 million, the volume of transactions constitutes around one per cent of the volume of 
regulated carbon markets (predominantly the EU Emissions Trading Scheme) (Hamilton et al 
2010; Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010). Despite their limited size, voluntary carbon markets are 
often promoted as a space for development-focused market innovation that is not possible 
under the restricted conditions of the regulated markets. 
 
However, the effects of the recent global financial crash highlight just some of the dangers of 
relying on voluntary emissions reductions and market mechanisms as a means to generate 
and distribute clean energy finance. During 2009 the voluntary market saw a 47 per cent drop 
in value as well as a significant redistribution of finance away from the developing world 
towards the US, and a shift from renewable energy projects towards methane destruction 
projects (Hamilton et al. 2010). The US market share of voluntary carbon projects doubled 
from 28 per cent to 56 per cent during 2009, driven by anticipation of compliance legislation, 
while the global market share of renewable energy projects decreased from 53 per cent in 
2009 to 17 per cent (figure 6). During the same period methane destruction projects roughly 
doubled in market share to 41 per cent, lending credence to fears of a ‗race to the bottom‘ in 
carbon markets as companies reduce discretionary spending and abandon the ‗development 
premium‘ of renewable energy projects in favour of cheaper sources of carbon credits 
(Hamilton et al. 2010). Methane destruction projects cannot provide the local benefits that 
potentially arise from renewable energy projects and in some cases quite the opposite has 
been true; landfill gas projects have been actively opposed by local residents who argue that 
carbon finance is giving a new lease of financial life to hazardous waste dumps that generate 
significant environmental health risks for the local population, predominantly marginalised 
citizens (Bond 2010). 
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Proposed reform of carbon markets will not address inbuilt issues of inequity and justice 
issues that arise from the displacement of emissions from industrialised countries to the 
developing world. But whether there is potential to redirect carbon finance to those with the 
greatest energy needs will largely be a product of the ability of institutions to address the 
governance challenges of redistribution. We return to this issue below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4: Inequality in Energy Distribution – In Brief 
 International aggregate figures can hide the significant disparities in energy access within 
countries, which can be as large as those between developing and industrialised nations. 
These inequalities also reveal significant gender, racial and class characteristics such that 
energy is often a powerful indicator of poverty and social exclusion in general. 
 The Millennium Development Goals in general, and specifically the goal to halve extreme 
poverty by 2015, cannot be achieved without new policies specifically designed to address 
Figure 6: Voluntary carbon markets provide limited, irregular funding streams for 
renewable energy 
a) Host countries of all voluntary carbon market projects (2009) 
 
b) Voluntary carbon market projects by type (2009) 
 
 
Source: Hamilton et al. (2010) 
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energy poverty. 
 Uneven energy access is a product not just of mal-distribution within countries, but also 
between them.  Energy sources are unevenly distributed globally and some energy flows 
create important vulnerabilities and pose threats to energy security. Global and domestic 
energy politics are intimately connected and are often played off against one another. 
 Energy security is not just about the international relations of geo-political security and 
competition for influence. In/security is also produced by the everyday practices of 
exploration, extraction and distribution. Clear examples of conflicts and contradictions 
between energy security and human rights are found throughout the global fossil fuel 
economy. 
 Questions of who gets to use what type of energy in a carbon-constrained world raise 
issues of energy justice in the form of responsibility (current versus historical) and 
entitlement (whose needs are most pressing and who decides who can emit how much). 
Various climate change policy proposals have sought to address these issues, each placing 
a different weighting on issues of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness, in terms of the 
ability to most rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Technological and market-based ‗clean energy‘ solutions to climate change also have the 
potential to impact upon energy justice whether it is the manufacture of solar photovoltaic 
modules or CDM projects which lead to struggles over land and the distribution of 
revenues derived from carbon credits. 
 Energy finance is currently highly unevenly distributed across sectors, technologies and 
countries. 
 Private financial flows in the energy sector increasingly outstrip those in the public sector. 
Yet while private finance and investment is to some extent governed by trade and 
investment rules, it often lies beyond the reach of systems of energy and environmental 
governance at the international level, such as they exist. 
 One way that governments already shape energy investment is through energy subsidies. 
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Recent renewed attention to the environmental damage and economic cost of fossil fuel 
subsidies has led to commitments from G20 countries to work towards fossil fuel subsidy 
reform. 
 CDM revenues constitute the largest source of mitigation finance to developing countries 
to date. However, to date there has been a poor relationship between the incidence of 
energy poverty and the flows of carbon finance, which make it highly questionable whether 
carbon markets have made a significant contribution to the alleviation of energy poverty. 
CDM investment has flowed to countries with a low risk investment and regulatory 
landscape, a favourable economic environment and with existing institutional links and 
social relations among investors. The distribution of carbon finance for clean energy within 
countries has also been highly uneven. 
 Whether there is potential to redirection carbon finance to those with the greatest energy 
needs will largely be a product of the ability of institutions to address the governance 
challenges of redistribution. 
 
 
3. Procedural issues 
Distributional inequities in access to energy and exposure to the positive and negative effects 
of energy production and distribution do not happen by accident. Though it is undoubtedly 
the case that some countries, peoples and regions of the world are endowed with valuable 
energy resources and others are not, it is organised political and economic entities (states and 
corporations) that have the power to extract, distribute and consume energy. If energy 
inequities are to be addressed in ways which might be considered fair and which seek to 
address the interconnected triple challenges of energy security, energy poverty and climate 
change, fundamental shifts are required in how we make energy policy, in the ways existing 
actors, institutions and policy-making processes function, and on whose behalf. 
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Below we look in turn at the role of institutions active in the area of energy governance, those 
which govern carbon markets, (considered to be a potentially important lever of finance for 
clean energy), and institutions of climate finance whose distribution of money for climate 
mitigation may have an important effect on energy policy strategies in the developing world 
in particular. 
 
3.1 Institutions of Energy Governance 
Strong and effective systems of governance are required to steer energy finance towards the 
fulfilment of policy goals around energy security, energy poverty and sustainability. It is 
widely recognised, however, that the weak, fragmented and poorly coordinated institutions 
we currently have are not up to this task (Florini and Sovacool 2009; Hirschl 2009). 
Weakness in this sense refers not to innate and latent potential of the institutions discussed 
below to perform key roles in realising energy policy goals, which could be quite 
considerable, but rather describes the levels of resources invested in them for the scale of the 
task that we face, and the low levels of political will to change institutional mandates and 
modes of operating to address the current reality of energy policy in a carbon (and eventually 
an oil) constrained world.  
 
Those institutions we do have, have been primarily focused on stabilising prices for fossil 
fuels or governing access to them. OPEC, for example, had the comparatively limited task of 
organising collective action on oil output and pricing among oil producing countries. Yet 
OPEC has historically demonstrated a limited ability to represent regional rivals and promote 
a unified political direction in the face of general market movements of boom and bust 
(Goldthau and Witte 2010). 
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The IEA was founded by major oil consuming countries in response to the governance 
challenges of the oil crises of the 1970s in which OPEC first took on its symbolic role as a 
representative of producer power, but has more recently expanded its agenda in response to 
climate change and especially with respect to energy efficiency measures, taking on a 
significant governance role through the provision of technical energy data. Yet claims of the 
IEA‘s generous interpretation of remaining global oil reserves and a perceived inadequacy of 
IEA work on renewable energy was instrumental in governmental efforts to create a new 
institution for the promotion of renewable energy, the International Renewable Energy 
Agency (IRENA) with more open global membership criteria (IRENA 2009; Florini 2010).  
 
While the G8, G20 and UN-Energy have clearer mandates to integrate energy poverty and 
climate change agendas into policy, the former meet infrequently and priorities of security 
and economy restrict their ability to promote a wider energy policy, while the UN-Energy 
holds a fairly weak position within the UN system and has struggled to exert influence over 
energy policy (UN-Energy 2011). UN-Energy was created in 2004 in the wake of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) under the auspices of the UN Chief 
Executives‘ Board. It is a permanent inter-agency mechanism open to all organisations in the 
UN system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, and about 20 agencies, programmes 
and organisations have joined. UN-Energy meets four to five times per year and its mandate 
includes: collaborative action in policy development, implementation in the area of energy, 
the maintenance of an overview of major initiatives within the system, and the promotion of 
the interaction with non-UN stakeholders in implementing energy related decisions made at 
the WSSD (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010). It is, therefore, more of a facilitating than an 
implementing agency. 
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Since the main focus of this paper is clean energy, this section will look firstly at energy 
financing and those bodies with a mandate to promote clean energy.  
 
A governance analysis of the contemporary landscape of energy finance reveals several 
trends with implications for energy equity (Newell 2011a). First, there is a huge imbalance 
between the expectations of what private energy finance should deliver in terms of tackling 
energy poverty and climate change in particular, and the weak governance systems in place to 
mobilise, channel and distribute that finance to where it is most needed. Second, the 
architecture of global energy governance has evolved in such a way that the roles and 
mandates of many institutions active in this area overlap and require greater degrees of 
coordination. We observe this challenge most acutely with regard the proliferation of bodies 
aiming to support the uptake of renewable energy. Tensions around the appropriate roles of 
the World Bank and the climate regime with regard to delivery of climate finance also 
highlight competition among actors to secure key roles in the governance of finance. Third, 
the fact that different streams of energy finance are governed by a plurality of actors with 
diverse and often competing mandates creates severe problems of policy incoherence where 
the objectives of one institution (tackling climate change) are often undermined by those of 
another (increasing energy use without regard to its carbon intensity). This suggests strongly 
overall that the ensemble of actors and initiatives currently active in the area of energy 
finance are not fit for purpose from the point of view of simultaneously providing the public 
goods of action to tackle climate change and energy poverty and measures to enhance energy 
security. 
 
Many Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) struggle with reconciling their role as 
institutions set up to tackle (energy) poverty and the role they now seek to secure for 
37 
 
themselves as climate finance institutions. We see this most clearly in the case of the World 
Bank where, despite some of the rhetoric in its emerging Energy Strategy Paper, there is a 
lack of evidence of systematic mainstreaming of climate criteria into its Country Assistance 
Strategies and other lending portfolios (Nakoodha 2008). In governance terms this raises the 
issue of policy incoherence when the activities of one part of the World Bank undermine 
those of another. Civil society activists have been quick to highlight examples of seeming 
inconsistency in policy objectives such as the World Bank-supported US$4.14 bn coal-
powered ‗Ultra Mega‘ 4,000 megawatt power plant in Gujarat India that will emit more 
carbon dioxide annually than the nation of Tunisia according to the US Department of Energy 
(Swan 2008). The failure to integrate climate change objectives into mainstream energy 
finance lending results in contradictory policy, even within the same organisation. A World 
Resources Institute (WRI) report found that, during the past three years, less than 30 per cent 
of the World Bank‘s lending to the energy sector has integrated climate considerations into 
project decision-making. As late as 2007, more than 50 per cent of the Bank‘s US$1.8 bn 
energy-sector portfolio did not include climate-change considerations at all (Nakhooda 2008).  
 
Beyond the role of international institutions in facilitating and financing clean energy, 
partnerships between public and private actors form an increasingly prominent part of the 
energy governance landscape. REEEP (Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership), for example, is an international public-private partnership funded by 
governments, businesses and development banks, aimed at identifying barriers and 
opportunities to the up-take of renewable energy and energy efficiency opportunities. This is 
explicit in the organisation‘s mission ‗to contribute to the expansion of the global market for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency… [through a] concerted effort to create a level 
playing field for sustainable energy‘. REEEP is focused on the development of market 
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conditions that foster sustainable energy and energy efficiency, and works to structure policy 
and regulatory initiatives for clean energy. Hence it both seeks to improve the existing legal 
and political frameworks that govern clean energy and finance projects that can attract 
investors and financiers who can develop and deploy clean energy technologies in other 
markets. It has supported around 130 clean energy projects in developing countries to date 
(REEEP 2011) 
 
Because REEEP is smaller it can be more flexible and quicker in decision-making than many 
IGOs. Because of the scale of funding that it oversees, REEEP also requires less oversight 
and process requirements than Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) project financing, for 
example. Lower levels of institutionalisation may, however, mean that it is easier to hold 
actors to account for their actions in such an environment (Florini and Sovacool 2009). It is 
easier to be inclusive and transparent when fewer actors are involved in making fewer 
decisions about less money and where implementation is largely left to partners on the 
ground in the countries where it works. Nevertheless, it relies on voluntary funding from 
several governments (mainly UK and Norway) whose stability and predictability may reduce 
the organisations effectiveness compared with other actors in the governance of energy 
finance, particularly in terms of planning of future activities. Donors also have a role in 
steering funds towards their priorities, the energy intensive emerging economies of Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia and South Africa.  
 
Alongside REEEP there is REN21 which describes itself as ‗a global policy network that 
provides a forum for international leadership on renewable energy‘. Its goal is to bolster 
policy development for the rapid expansion of renewable energies in developing and 
industrialised economies. Open to a wide variety of dedicated stakeholders, REN21 ‗connects 
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governments, international institutions, non-governmental organisations, industry 
associations, and other partnerships and initiatives‘ (REN21 2008). The stakeholder approach 
of REN21 is reflected in the governance structure whereby a steering committee of 
approximately 30 individuals representing different parties interested in renewable energy 
shape a strategy which is then implemented by the REN21 secretariat (6 staff), a small outfit 
overseeing a budget of around US$1 million. In the case of both REEEP and REN21, 
therefore, they are small organisations with limited capacity in terms of staff and resources, 
heavily reliant on collaboration and partnership with other organisations and not yet able to 
shape energy finance on anything like the scale of other institutions such as regional or 
multilateral development banks. 
 
The Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) meanwhile is a 
public-private partnership that brings together the governments and private sectors of 
Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, the United States and, since October 2007, Canada – 
countries that collectively account for more than half the world‘s economy, population and 
energy use (APP 2008). Though the APP is voluntary and not legally binding, it is intended 
to be ‗politically binding‘. The APP aims to facilitate investment in clean technologies, goods 
and services, accelerate the sharing of energy-efficient best practices, and identify policy 
barriers to the diffusion of clean energy technologies. The US-based Policy and 
Implementation Committee, comprising representatives from the partners, governs the overall 
framework, policies and procedures, guides the Task Forces and periodically reviews the 
progress of the Partnership. 
 
The Partnership is based on a highly decentralised structure, whereby a project or activity 
involving any two or more partners that contributes to the objectives of the partnership is 
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eligible for inclusion. Though it is too early to comment on delivery of tangible benefits, 
supporters emphasise the delivery of new finance and the removal of barriers to the transfer 
of technologies and the uptake of clean energy options. For example, the ‗Barriers to Clean 
Technology Investment Development and Deployment between Australia and India‘ project, 
with a total budget of approximately $250,000, aims to identify the market and policy barriers 
to enhanced collaboration between Australia and India in the investment, development and 
deployment of clean technologies defined as clean coal technologies, renewable energy and 
distributed generation. It is claimed that ‗The findings of the project will serve to develop 
practical solutions to climate change by accelerating the development, transfer and 
deployment of clean technological solutions between the two countries‘ (APP 2008). Given 
that carbon capture and storage is one of the central technological options for the Partnership, 
some critics view the APP as a ‗coal pact‘, suggesting that it is more about selling coal than 
addressing climate change. Whilst partnership members recognise that renewable energy and 
nuclear power will represent an increasing share of global energy supply, they stress that 
fossil fuels underpin their economies now and for the predictable future. The continued 
economic use of (cleaner) fossil fuels is consequently at the core of the Partnership‘s policy.  
 
3.2 Carbon Market Institutions 
Carbon finance is often viewed as an important source of revenue for renewable and clean 
energies and a potentially important driver of action on climate change. For example, 
Certified Emissions Reductions amounting to more than 2.7 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) equivalent are expected to be produced in the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol (2008–2012) through its Clean Development Mechanism (UNFCCC 2011). Over the 
2001 to 2012 period, CDM projects could raise US$15-$24 billion in direct carbon revenues 
for developing countries (World Bank 2009a) 
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Nevertheless procedural issues have been at the heart of concerns about the uneven 
distribution of CDM projects and claims and counter-claims about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its project approval and decision-making procedures. The CDM and the 
voluntary carbon offset market that has emerged alongside it have faced accusations of 
‗climate fraud‘; corruption in the claims made about saved (additional) emissions and about 
whether projects supported through the CDM and voluntary market would have happened 
anyway without additional financing (Bachram 2004). The Executive Board is the main 
governing body of the CDM. It reports to the Meeting of the Parties. The Executive Board is 
comprised of ten representatives of Parties to the Protocol—five members and five 
alternates—who may serve for a total of four consecutive years. There is one representative 
from each of the five UN regions, two additional representatives from both Annex I and Non-
Annex I nations, and one representative from Small Island Developing States. Executive 
Board members must sign a written oath declaring that they have no financial interests at 
stake in the CDM, and are obligated not to disclose confidential or proprietary information 
both during and after their tenure as Board members. There have also been claims, however, 
of conflicts of interest involving members of CDM Executive Board who are involved in 
proposing projects and methodologies which they have the authority to approve as members 
of the Executive Board.  
 
Jessica Green in her study concludes:  
Although many of the oversight procedures in place appear to be functioning well, 
there are some fundamental structural issues that may contribute to agents acting in 
rent-seeking ways, to the detriment of the principals. Specifically, the small number of 
firms qualified to carry out monitoring and verification raises concerns of monopoly 
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and collusion… Finally, there is little evidence that the ―police patrol‖ oversight 
mechanisms are functioning well. In sum, the data indicate that though the CDM was 
designed in a way to maximise the Executive Board‘s control over the Designated 
Operational Entities, in practice, we cannot be assured that these private agents are not 
pursuing their own goals, at the cost of those delegated to them (Green 2008:2).  
 
Effective regulation of Designated Operating Entities who provide the front line quality 
control checks on whether CDM projects are truly additional and have produced the volume 
of emissions claimed (in order that they can be issued with CERs), is very difficult.  There 
have been temporary suspensions of some firms from the approved list of service providers, 
but the incentives for project developers and auditors to exaggerate emissions reductions 
remain high. 
 
Beyond the ‗good governance‘ of the CDM in terms of improving the transparency and 
quality control of the mechanism, there is a broader set of issues about increasing incentives 
through further moves towards programmatic and sectoral approaches as well as attempts, 
initiated at the Nairobi meetings, to reduce transaction costs of project approval and delivery 
for smaller-scale projects and those from the poorest regions of the world (Figueres and 
Streck 2009) to ensure that offset finance makes the greatest contribution it can to financing 
clean energy (Box 5). 
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Box 5: The links between procedural and distributional justice in alleviating energy 
poverty: carbon finance for rural development and climate co-benefits  
 
Through carbon markets and multilateral investment programs, clean cookstoves are one of 
a limited number of technologies that are being used to access climate finance for explicit 
rural development objectives. But early studies of the use of carbon finance for scaling-up 
cookstove projects suggest that a more nuanced view of ‗win-win‘ scenarios for climate and 
development benefits is needed in order to address equity in clean energy deployment. 
 
For example, carbon finance may create financial incentives for addressing longstanding 
challenges of longevity in cookstove programmes, by requiring ongoing project monitoring 
and institutional support in order to continue the flow of carbon credits based on continued 
carbon emissions reductions. 
 
On the other hand, the necessary degree of standardisation required of carbon financed 
cookstove projects could lead to systematic neglect of the diversity of household energy 
needs. In order to scale-up small initiatives to a level at which GHG emissions become 
significant (and therefore to demonstrate the value-added by carbon finance), adaptive 
programme design and attention to the numerous variables that influence household 
adoption of clean technologies are not possible. Experience suggests that one-size-fits-all 
approaches do not work for income- and energy-poor groups, leading to poor project 
sustainability. 
 
In contrast to the presiding view in the design of some climate finance programs (e.g. the 
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SREP, see Box 6), there are no technologies for which social benefits will ‗automatically‘ 
result. Scaling up decentralised energy generation through carbon finance faces numerous 
governance challenges, notably the need to meet the requirements of emissions accounting 
while designing programs to be adaptive to diverse household needs.  
 
Source: Simon, Bumpus and Mann (2010), World Bank (2009a), Practical Action (2010) 
 
 
3.3 Climate Change Institutions 
Since how the international community addresses climate change could have a huge bearing 
on energy equity, it is worth briefly considering the extent to which and the ways in which 
poorer groups and developing countries can represent their interests in the institutions 
charged with responding to climate change, most notably the UNFCCC.  
 
Poorer developing countries have traditionally sought strength in numbers in the climate 
negotiations by developing common positions within the G77 + China grouping (Bulkeley 
and Newell 2010), but the cohesiveness of this group has fragmented over time reflecting the 
contributions many leading developing countries make to the problem as well as the uneven 
exposure to the effects of climate change of many of the world‘s poorest countries (Najam et 
al. 2003; Barnett 2008). Added to this are a series of generic procedural barriers to effective 
participation that reduce the likelihood that developing countries can increase the 
responsiveness of the climate change negotiations to their core concerns. Inequities in 
capacity and participation mean most governments from developing countries are not able 
even to be continuously present throughout the entire negotiation process, let alone 
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adequately represent their citizens‘ interests in arenas where demands for legal and scientific 
expertise are high.  
 
Issues of access, representation, transparency in the climate negotiations came to the fore at 
the time of the Copenhagen Conference of Parties (COP) summit in December 2009 and 
continue to enjoy a high profile in post Copenhagen debates about the tenability of mega-
processes and how to improve the voice of developing countries in particular (beyond the 
BASIC countries
8
). While a remarkable 194 countries attended the Copenhagen summit in 
2010, this number still masks disparities in effective negotiating capability and influence, 
which came to a head with the negotiations of the Copenhagen Accord by a small number of 
powerful states (UNFCCC 2009). For example, the top five polluting countries were able to 
field more than three times the number of delegates than the five countries considered to be 
most affected by climate change
9
. Because the delegations of many developing countries lack 
capacity, they have difficulty effectively participating in the many meetings that are held 
simultaneously and ensuring their voice is heard. Neither do they have access to ‗informal‘ 
meetings held before and during COP meetings, where the major players and contributors to 
the problem come together to advance progress, but from which most smaller and less 
influential countries are excluded (Newell 2000). This has not reduced demands for 
participation, a situation which produced a crisis during the Copenhagen summit when the 
premises could not accommodate a record 900 observer organisations and the security 
entourage of 196 heads of states that joined the talks (UNFCCC 2009) 
Disparities in effective representation between industrialised and developing countries do not 
only affect state parties, they are also evident among observer organisations. During the 
                                               
8 The group of BASIC countries comprises Brazil, South Africa, India and China 
9 Transparency International calculations based on COP 15 documentation, pollution data from 2006 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/air_co2_emissions.htm), and Climate Risk Index 2010 by Germanwatch 
(http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/cri2010.pdf). 
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Kyoto negotiations only a fourth of the organisations in attendance came from the global 
South, and many of these could only afford to send one or two observers. And although by 
summer 2009 more than 1,000 organisations from 80 countries had obtained observer status, 
a closer look reveals the majority are based in Europe and North America. More than 210 
organisations from the US, for example, are registered as observers, alongside 100 groups 
from Britain and 92 from Canada. Meanwhile, no developing country except for Brazil, 
China and India managed to bring more than 10 observer organisations to the table 
(Dombrowski 2009). As one assessment puts it: 
 
Mending the current disjuncture between those involved in the policy formation, 
negotiating and decision making process, and the citizens who are most vulnerable to 
climate change is thus to a significant extent a matter of closing the accountability gap 
in global climate governance. Accountability on its own will not be sufficient to 
adequately address the climate change challenge. It is however a fundamental and 
necessary condition for building a socially and environmentally effective global climate 
governance system that delivers for people (One World Trust 2009). 
 
3.4 Climate Finance Institutions 
Procedural concerns also pertain to the funds set up to manage climate finance, including for 
energy sector mitigation: who pays how much and which institution gets to set priorities and 
distribute funds. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), for example, which until recently 
was the main body responsible for overseeing flows of finance and technology under the 
climate regime, is formally accountable to, and functions under, the authority of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the climate agreements. However, in practice, the 
conventions have limited voice in the day-to-day governance and decision-making process of 
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the GEF (Müller 2009). Many developing countries have also felt very little if any ownership 
over the GEF, which they see as dominated by donor concerns (Young 2002; Ballesteros et 
al. 2009), and disregarding guidance by the UNFCCC Conference of Parties. This 
dissatisfaction led, in a first instance, to the adoption of a one-country-one-vote rule and 
majority representation for developing countries on the governing body.
 
This was a 
fundamental departure from the previous arrangements for climate change funds, where 
donors had an implicit veto (Müller and Winkler 2008). 
 
It is the Climate Investment Funds of the World Bank, however, which are attracting most 
attention since they represent more public finance than has ever before been dedicated to 
climate change. The governance of the various CIFs is noteworthy because there are an equal 
number of representatives from donor governments and developing country governments on 
the governing committees for each of the trust funds, with decisions made by consensus. All 
the governments contributing funds to the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), for example, are 
represented on its governing trust fund committee through a process of self selection amongst 
interested developed countries. Direct participation does not of course necessarily imply 
greater influence over outcomes, especially as donor countries tend to be represented by 
ministries of finance and development while developing countries are more likely to be 
represented by less powerful ministries of environment (Ballesteros et al. 2009). The fact that 
observers from organisations such as the Global Environment Facility and UNFCCC 
Secretariat (also active in the area of climate-energy finance) are excluded from investment 
plan discussions makes it difficult to ensure that programs supported by multilateral 
institutions are complementary.  
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Because of their public mandates, however, high levels of transparency and accountability are 
expected of public institutions, creating openings for reform for those actors seeking to 
influence the way they govern energy (Box 6). The World Bank‘s CTF claims to ‗ensure full 
transparency and openness in governance, oversight and evaluation processes‘ through the 
operation of a Trust Fund Committee. One way in which this transparency is to be achieved 
is through the Partnership Forum to the CIFs, which includes civil society representatives, 
recipient governments and the UN to ‗discuss the strategic direction‘ of the funds. However, 
it is not conferred formal decision-making power and while some committee meetings are 
open to observers, CIF deliberations over budgets and work programmes and CTF 
discussions of investment plans are presently closed ‗executive sessions‘, citing sensitive 
national issues as the reason for excluding some observers (Nakhooda 2010). Likewise, clean 
technology investment plans have not been publicly disclosed prior to deliberations by the 
trust fund committee and there were few opportunities for stakeholders to debate or influence 
the design parameters of the body (Ballesteros et al. 2009). Nakhooda (2009) also finds that 
there is limited evidence to date of engagement with stakeholders outside of government in 
the design of their Clean Technology Investment plans, missing an opportunity for 
international public finance to introduce greater government accountability to citizens. 
 
Box 6. Transparency and Accountability in the World Bank Program for Scaling Up 
Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries (SREP): implications for equity 
 
The Scaling up Renewable Energy Programme is the youngest and least developed of the 
World Bank‘s Climate Investment Funds, having been launched at the Copenhagen climate 
summit in 2009 with the aim to catalyse new economic opportunities for private sector 
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investment in renewable energy production in low income countries. 
 
With a specific objective to increase energy access, the SREP design document includes the 
requirement for country investment plans to be 
... designed and implemented with the full and effective participation and involvement 
of, and with respect for the rights of, indigenous peoples and local communities, 
building on existing mechanisms for collaboration and consultation (World Bank 
2009a: 5) 
 
Notwithstanding criticisms of restricted consultation in other CIF design processes to date, 
there remains a tension between the speed at which investment plans are set up and the 
possibility for host country ownership of the process. Perhaps more important is the issue of 
meaningful participation from all stakeholders in consultations, particularly where visions of 
the best interventions for equitable outcomes differ starkly from those of the donor, for 
example on the appropriate level of foreign direct investment in investment plans. 
 
The World Bank‘s own assessment notes that directing SREP financing to small scale 
renewable energy services would provide greater opportunities for social co-benefits, 
especially for women (World Bank 2010a). These modes of energy delivery have largely 
been sidelined in the middle income country-focused Clean Technology Fund in favour of 
large scale on-grid renewable energy and transportation projects. The distinction of the SREP 
from the CTF has also been questioned following the selection of two middle income 
countries for the six-country pilot phase of the SREP, a selection process that observers have 
criticised as non-transparent. 
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However important the role of global and regional institutions in energy governance might 
be, including those with responsibility for indirect energy finance through for carbon and 
climate finance, we have seen already that governments guard jealously their right to 
determine their own energy futures in line with domestic and foreign policy objectives. Yet 
national governance is often sidelined in international finance mechanisms such as the CIFs 
in favour of programme design based on the notion that finance, technology and markets are 
largely sufficient to catalyse global energy transitions. For example, it was not until late 2010 
that consideration of national institutions, policies and regulatory context were included in 
the CTF results management framework (Nakhooda 2010). This means that improving levels 
of procedural justice in international institutions has to be complimented by efforts to 
improve the processes by which decisions are made by states that look set to remain the key 
actors in energy governance. It is to this that we turn in section 3.6 of the paper. 
 
3.5 Energy Governance for whom? 
Looking across the above initiatives it is possible to discern cross-cutting trends. Firstly, for 
whom (for other governments, businesses) and for what finance is intended (e.g as aid or 
investment) makes a big difference to how it is governed and who benefits. The way the 
different institutions and organisations surveyed here govern energy finance clearly reflects 
their mandates and who they consider to be their main clients or constituencies. Grants and 
concessional finance often comes with donor conditions and the need for guarantees about 
how money will be spent since public money has to be accounted for. With market based 
mechanisms such as the CDM, governance systems reflect the fact that the aim is to facilitate 
 
Sources: World Bank (2009a, 2010); Nakoodha (2010); Bretton Woods Project (2011) 
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the market and ensure environmental integrity, whereas the governance of sustainable 
development benefits is much weaker. Likewise since REN21 and REEEP are reliant on high 
levels of engagement and interest from the private sector if they are to achieve their goals, 
they need to show that they occupy and can effectively fill an important market niche. 
 
Secondly, the degree of ‗public-ness‘ of the governing institution seems to make a big 
difference to expectations and procedures regarding accountability (to whom, about what and 
how) and participation (who participates and on whose terms). The UN can claim 
‗universality of participation, openness to non-state observers and relative transparency in 
proceedings‘ (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010:192); however, counter-intuitively public-ness is 
not necessarily a good indicator of strong enforceability and implementation. Despite having 
access to the power, resources and authority of states, many public IGOs do not seem to 
wield significant direct power, perhaps because even their own members resist this in an area 
as sensitive as energy and because of the difficulty of directly regulating powerful private 
energy providers. The experience of strong member control within OPEC would bear this 
out. Direct control of finance (and the ability to grant or withhold it) and a more permanent 
institutional presence (such as in the case of the MDBs) means direct enforcement may be 
easier to achieve should the political will exist.  
 
Box 7: Key messages on energy governance 
 
 There has been a tremendous proliferation in actors and institutions involved in the 
governance of energy finance in a variety of ways. This has created significant 
challenges of coordination and policy coherence. 
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 States and international institutions have made significant use of their powers to steer 
energy finance through investment and trade regimes and through re-structuring the 
energy sector in many parts of the developing world. They have thus far not made 
extensive use of these to mobilise or direct energy finance towards tackling energy 
poverty or climate change. 
 Levering private finance to address energy poverty, energy security and climate 
change is critical, but needs to be balanced with significant disincentives for business 
as usual investments in energy that undermine the achievement of these policy 
objectives.  
 
 
3.6 Just Transitions? 
How governments make energy policy has a huge impact on energy equity: who has access to 
energy and on what terms. Some of these choices are constrained by trade and investment 
treaties or affected by deliberations in international institutions in the area of energy, carbon 
and climate. But governments remain key actors in energy policy. From research to 
extraction to distribution and consumption, states and public institutions are heavily involved 
in governing public energy finance. The public sector provides capital for large infrastructure 
projects. Hence although governments account for less than 15 per cent of global economy 
wide investment, they largely control the underlying infrastructure investments that affect 
opportunities for providing support to clean energy (World Bank, 2009b). 
 
The sensitivity around issues of energy supply and access and its geopolitical and strategic 
importance mean most states prefer to maintain autonomy and control over energy pathways. 
It is no surprise, therefore, that chapters in regional and bilateral trade and investment 
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agreements dealing with energy, for example, have proven to be among the most sensitive. 
The effect of this is that few global institutions exercise direct authority over energy 
resources. It is the case though that where energy features in trade and investment 
agreements, and when key decisions about energy access and security are taken in arenas to 
which broader publics are excluded, those affected, such as poorer consumers and indigenous 
peoples, have mobilised to demand both procedural justice (the right to participate in 
deliberations which affect them) and distributional justice (either defence of their land from 
energy exploration and extraction or greater access to the rents extracted from the resource 
exploitation) (Newell 2007).  
 
Governments will have to play a key enabling and steering role, therefore, in improving 
levels of support and access to clean energy and mediating the competing powerful interests 
at stake in any effort to transition to lower carbon forms of energy production and 
consumption. In this regard, there was some discussion in Cancún around the idea of ‗just 
transitions‘: how to ensure moves towards a low carbon economy are equitable, sustainable 
and legitimate in the eyes of their citizens. This raises a whole series of process issues about 
how decisions are taken, options assessed and trade-offs made between different energy 
futures. It builds on interventions such as that by the government of Argentina in the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action which called for mechanisms to ensure a 
fair transition for workers that might suffer socio-economic impacts of measures taken to 
effect climate mitigation. This implies both economic resources and technology transfer to 
poorer countries, as well as the strengthening of key institutions to oversee industrial 
restructuring in a way that generates ‗sustainable jobs‘ (UNEP et al. 2008; SecAyDS 2009).  
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Aside from calls for ‗just transitions‘ in international arenas, there have been movements 
mobilising around this, going beyond a focus on ‗transition towns‘ which have been initiated 
in the UK for example to prepare for a world after oil (Bulkeley and Newell 2010), to 
emphasise the social justice elements of such a transformation (Box 8).
10
 Getting the support 
of a broad range of actors behind difficult policy choices and engaging with local initiatives 
which share similar goals will clearly be key to their success. This can be done either through 
engagement with a broad based set of social movements and community actors in defining an 
alternative vision for a region, seeking to bring together a coalition of actors to provide and 
finance ‗just energy‘ (Box 9) or, as in cases in Nepal and Brazil, involving poorer people 
directly in the management of their own energy systems (Box 10).   
  
                                               
10
 One of the earliest formulations of the concept of a ‗just transition‘ was developed in the 1980s by the trades 
union movement in the US in response to the introduction of regulation to prevent air and water pollution, which 
resulted in the closure of industries that contributed to the pollution. The UK‘s Trade Union Congress has 
campaigned for the same principles to be applied to industries in the UK that will be affected by low-carbon 
restructuring (TUC 2008). 
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Box 8: Defining a Just Transition 
 
A just transition would aim firstly to take appropriate measures to protect jobs in 
vulnerable industries. This will be important where there is a risk that job losses would 
simply mean the transfer of carbon intensive activities to other countries or where 
organisations are failing to take sufficient steps to prepare for the low-carbon transition. 
Where job losses are unavoidable, it would provide adequate support for those people and 
sectors that stand to lose out as a result of decarbonising the economy. It would also 
ensure that new jobs created in low carbon growth areas are ‗decent‘ jobs (which pay a 
decent wage, provide decent working conditions, are accessible to the right people and 
offer decent career progression opportunities)  
 
Source: Bird and Lawton 2009 
 
 
 
Box 9: Mobilising from Below for Just Transitions  
 
The Just Transition Alliance 
The Just Transition Alliance is a coalition of environmental justice and labour 
organisations. Together with frontline workers, and community members who live 
alongside polluting industries, it seeks to create healthy workplaces and communities. It 
focuses on contaminated sites that should be cleaned up, and on the transition to clean 
production and sustainable economies. For example, on issues such as ‗clean coal‘ the Just 
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Transition Alliance voices objections based on local as well as global impacts, including 
local air pollution, working conditions and detrimental environmental impacts of mining 
on local landscapes and water use. 
 
Just Energy 
Just Energy is an innovative collaboration between a development NGO (Oxfam), an 
engineering firm (Arup), a legal firm (Simmons & Simmons), a university (MIT) and 
consulting companies (McKinsey and Marmanie). Based in South Africa it aims to enable 
low-income communities to develop renewable energy enterprises as a means of 
generating revenue and employment opportunities. The overall goal is to provide ‗a fair 
return on renewable energy for local people and investors alike‘. As part of this it has set 
itself the following goals to be achieved by 2020: 
 
 To develop 20 RE enterprises of 10-80 MW of clean energy starting with wind farms 
in South Africa, then to develop enterprises across Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
 To generate income streams of £3 million per year for social and economic 
development in low-income communities 
 Reduce carbon emissions by 1.8 million tonnes per year 
 Create jobs and transfer new business and technology skills to local people 
 Transform RE markets in developing countries so that low-income communities 
receive fair value for what they bring to the project 
 
City Retrofit Los Angeles 
A grassroots coalition of community-based organisations, trades unions and environmental 
groups (the LA Apollo Alliance) campaigned to ensure that programmes by the city 
57 
 
council to improve energy efficiency and the use of RE also brought economic benefits to 
disadvantaged people living in the city. This included retrofit of public buildings in low-
income communities, jobs for poorer people and supporting businesses owned by local 
minorities and women. 
 
Gelsenkirchen Germany 
This city was a renowned industrial hub for coal, steel and glass industries until the 
relocation of heavy industry. In the 1990s local officials decided to regenerate land 
abandoned by the industry and set up an energy technology park. Supported by the 
European Union, the federal government and the utility RWE solar technology became the 
new focus of development. In 2001 the city took on a voluntary carbon reduction target 
aimed at transforming it from a ‗city of a thousand furnaces to a city of a thousand suns‘.  
 
Australia’s Hunter Valley 
In Australia's Hunter Valley, community distress about the cumulative local ecological and 
human health impacts of mines and power stations and alarm about global climate change 
has given rise to a vocal, growing and globally-linked social movement that is challenging 
the primacy of coal, and demanding a transition from coal dependency to a clean energy 
economy. Key aspects of a just transition to an ecological economy that protects vulnerable 
communities include the critical role of boosting resilience and adaptive capacity, public 
investment in the industries of the future, and of alliances between the climate justice, 
environment and labour movements. 
 
Sources:  Bird and Lawton (2009), Evans (2010), JTA (2011), Just Energy (2011). 
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Box 10: The Right to Energy? 
 
Access to energy is not just conferred from above; poorer people often mobilise around 
fuel prices, subsidies and demands over the right to energy, sometimes with successful 
results. India‘s Centre for Science and Environment describes how people without access 
to modern energy are seeking to increase their influence over its distribution: 
 
People of Nepal are exercising their right to energy, granted through a notification of the 
government. This programme, in which communities pay certain charges for grid 
connectivity and take over the management (including billing) is reshaping the ways in 
which electricity is distributed and managed across rural Nepal — all the way from a 
mother‘s group in North Pokhra to a forest users‘ group in Bangesal to a Thame Bijli 
Company that has trained 11 Sherpas as linesmen and meter readers (Yadav 2010).  
 
In Brazil, local farmers have been driven by limited electricity supply, poor reliability and 
high prices to take control of the previously dysfunctional and undemocratic CRERAL 
electricity cooperative. Taking advantage of low local capital costs, an existing distribution 
network, the availability of commercial loans and more recently carbon credits, CRERAL 
has been able to finance and manage two mini hydro plants that now supply around a 
quarter of local electricity needs to its membership of around 6000 families. 
 
Local meetings on decisions are held in all of the cooperative‘s municipalities, giving all 
members the opportunity to express local priorities and suggest appropriate uses for 
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CRERAL annual income at the General Assembly. More localised decision making allows 
for greater adaptability in governing local issues, such as the local allocation of electricity 
or individual families that face financial difficulties. 
 
Source: Ashden Awards (2008), Yadav (2010)  
 
There are also tools and measures governments can use to engage publics in deliberations 
about energy futures which to some extent seek to bridge the elite and closed world of 
government and businesses decision-making on energy policy and the sorts of bottom-up 
initiatives described above. Box 11 provides a summary of one such effort by the Dutch 
government.  
 
 
Box 11: Restructuring Energy Systems for Sustainability? Lessons from the Dutch 
government experience 
 
The Goal: To achieve a sustainable energy system by pursuing three major goals: security 
of supply, environmental quality and economic efficiency.  
 
How did it work? 
 The energy transition project (ET) is mainly based on the activities of transition 
platforms in which individuals from the private and the public sector come together to 
develop a common ambition for particular areas (transition themes), develop pathways 
and suggest transition experiments. 
 The initial selection of transition themes was based on stakeholder consultations as 
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well as an intensive scenario study
11
. Its intention was to stimulate discussions about the 
energy supply in the Netherlands in 2050. It focused on devising a portfolio of strategies 
for investment decisions, sustainability and R&D which result in minimum regrets 
 After developing strategic visions for the selected themes, the task of the platforms is 
to work out possible transition pathways along which an energy transition can be 
achieved. 
 The pathways are explored further by transition experiments carried out by 
coalitions of stakeholders. The experiments propose ways to travel along the suggested 
transition paths 
 The transition platforms were complemented by a taskforce energy transition 
(TFE) of high level members mainly from industry and the public sector. This advisory 
group was charged with the task to oversee the transition process and identify strategic 
directions.  
 The ET project is funded through public subsidies and investments by companies. 
 
Reflections and Limitations 
 Though energy R&D policy is synchronised with the energy transitions priorities, 
linkages with other areas of policy – such as on renewables – has been weak. 
 There has been a neglect of behavioural change, demand reduction and non-
technological aspects of transitions and core energy policy issues such as security of 
supply, liberalisation and affordable prices have not been affected by the ET. 
 There has been a dominance of business actors over civil society organisations and 
of larger companies rather than small and medium enterprises. 
 A lack of close oversight from the executive branch of government and the 
                                               
11 The Long-Term Energy Supply Strategy (LTVE) project 
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parliament has been observed. 
 Other methods of sustainability appraisal such as multi-criteria evaluation might 
enable a broader range of sustainability issues to be taken into account and allow for 
deeper stakeholder engagement given that the ET taskforces are not accountable for their 
actions and offer limited representations of societal interests. 
 
Source: Kern and Smith (2008) 
 
4. Conclusion: Towards global energy justice? 
The UN has declared 2012 the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All. How can an  
unevenly energy insecure world be transformed into one of clean energy access ‗for all‘? To 
cope with the problems of energy insecurity, energy poverty and climate change will require 
new sources of finance, novel technologies and substantial reforms to institutions and policy-
making processes. None will be easy to deliver, nor will any, in isolation, be a panacea. 
Issues of equity and justice will be intrinsic to whichever energy trajectory is pursued, 
however, and they need to be better understood and anticipated. Pursuing a ‗just transition‘ to 
a low-carbon economy may provide one foundation upon which to build energy justice in a 
carbon-constrained world. Some of the examples above suggest tentative and exploratory 
moves in this direction, but clearly there is a long way to go. 
 
Energy injustices in access, security, and around climate change, as well as being a product of 
the organisation of a particular type of global fossil fuel economy, also reflect weak and 
incoherent global energy governance. International institutions with missions related to 
energy issues including the International Energy Agency, OPEC, UN-Energy and the Global 
Environment Facility, as well as public private partnerships such as the Renewable Energy 
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and Energy Efficiency Partnership and REN21, do not currently amount to a substantive, 
coherent, or effective architecture of global energy governance. There is little evidence to 
date of initiatives at the international level that seek to regulate energy to ensure it meets 
specific goals of sustainability or energy poverty for example. This is in spite of calls from 
the Vienna Energy Conference for energy development goals for energy access in 2030 or for 
a stronger role for UN-Energy to drive an integrated and coordinated energy agenda 
internationally and across the UN system (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen 2010). 
 
Levering new investments in clean energy is one thing, but who will regulate existing energy 
financing which contributes neither to tackling energy poverty, energy security or improving 
environmental sustainability? A transition to a more effective system of global energy 
governance surely requires us to both increase support for clean energy and reduce 
dependence on ‗dirty‘ energy. We currently have a situation in which institutions bequeathed 
formal roles and mandates in relation to energy are not necessarily those that wield most 
direct power over energy finance; the lack of governance of private energy investment is a 
case in point. A robust system of global energy governance needs not just to facilitate and 
enable clean energy for all, but seek to shift resources and political support from forms of 
energy production and distribution which do not have a long term future in providing energy 
security and climate change, even if in the short term they may have a role to play in 
alleviating the energy poverty of the poorest.   
 
As pressure grows to recognise energy as one of the Millennium Development Goals and as 
calls for universal access intensify, it is possible that pressures for stronger forms of 
institutionalisation of energy governance will intensify. Energy‘s relationship to security and 
the environment, particularly climate change, has long been a feature of the G8 agenda and 
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more recently of the G20. There is a potential complementary nexus between energy, 
poverty, and climate change (Box 12; Casillas and Kammen 2010) in spite of the conflicts 
and trade-offs described above, but stronger forms of governance to manage these trade-offs 
globally have yet to seriously emerge. Hence the pursuit of energy justice requires strategic 
reflection about which arenas are most likely to deliver outcomes beneficial to those living 
without energy, with the injustices created by the energy choices of others, or with the effects 
of climate change generated by existing systems of energy production and consumption. 
  
Box 12: International Governance for Energy Security? 
The case for: 
 Energy demand is expected to double over the next 30 years, mostly in developing 
countries. Collective efforts to meet this are required 
 Fossil fuels will continue to provide the vast majority of energy in spite of their 
contribution to climate change  
 These are unevenly distributed giving rise to a global trade in energy which requires 
rules and governance 
 That trade is conducted on an uneven playing field with unequal bargaining power 
which can distort markets and prices and increase volatility   
 
Potential roles: 
 Establish universal pricing of carbon 
 Collective management of remaining oil reserves 
 Collective management of nuclear fuel cycles 
 Encouraging higher investment in energy R&D relevant to energy security and 
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climate change goals 
 
Source: Yueh (2010) 
 
It is also clear that addressing multiple inequities, facilitating ‗just transitions‘ through more 
transparent and inclusive decision-making and targeting the cultural aspects of (energy) 
consumption cannot be done from above, even if a more effective enabling environment can 
be created regionally and globally. Calling for more effective coordination of global 
responses to energy policy dilemmas is not the same as advocating one-size-fits all 
approaches to energy governance which would likely be ineffective in addressing the 
multitude of political, economic and social contexts in which day to day decision-making on 
energy occurs. The question is whether the different sites of energy governance can be 
enrolled and engaged in collective endeavours to tackle energy poverty and climate change 
and to enhance energy security.    
 
Strong levels of alignment and coherence around a limited number of policy goals may not be 
possible given the number of competing actors and policy goals at play, or desirable, since it 
would imply that power is being exercised to marginalise consideration of other objectives 
and interests. It is notable, however, that stronger and more robust systems of governance are 
in place for energy finance than of energy finance. Many trade and investment treaties seek to 
liberalise energy sectors and protect investor rights, even over those of governments. 
Sweeping reform of the energy sector has been overseen by international financial institutions 
in many parts of the world with a view to opening up markets. States have made considerable 
use of their powers to mobilise and attract private investment in the energy sector. Yet they 
have not gone so far, to date at least, in using such powers to steer energy finance towards 
tackling energy poverty (Sanchez 2010) or climate change. For this to happen, we need much 
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higher levels of political will, ambition and leadership, since only then will the necessary 
changes take place in the global governance of energy that enable us to pursue clean energy 
equitably. 
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Pursuing Clean Energy Equitably – In Brief 
 
1. Energy does not currently flow to where it is needed most or to those that most need it. 
It is also not, on the whole, produced by actors with an interest in addressing either 
energy poverty or climate change. 
  
2. Though there is hope that carbon markets and climate finance for mitigation might 
provide an impetus for low carbon energy for the poor, the current scale and scope of 
such finance is unlikely to leave much impression on the vast flows of energy finance 
which continue to be invested in fossil fuels in most parts of the world.  
 
3. There are currently vast inequities in energy distribution and in the local and global 
exposure to the effects of current patterns of energy production and consumption. 
Whether it is petro-violence, local air pollution or longer term climate change, poorer 
people the world over bear a disproportionate share of the human and ecological costs 
of the fossil fuel economy, while receiving few of its benefits.  
 
4. Though governments themselves are often implicated in creating such problems, there 
remains a central role for governments and international institutions to ensure that 
policy objectives around energy poverty and climate change are addressed and to use a 
mix of regulation and incentives to create an enabling environment for energy options 
which are simultaneously able to improve energy security and relieve energy poverty 
in a less carbon intensive fashion.  
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5. In the context of a global economy in which many governments have relinquished 
direct control over parts of their energy systems this presents key challenges that need 
to be addressed since efficiency of delivery in an open market may not be the best way 
to ensure energy security while tackling energy poverty and climate change. 
 
6. If the vast financial and political resources that are currently committed to fossil fuels 
were re-directed towards sustainable forms of energy generation and distribution, 
climate compatible clean energy could move from ambition to reality. 
 
7. Such a shift is and will continue to encounter strong opposition from actors that 
greatly profit from, and are extremely dependent upon, high levels of fossil fuel use. 
This resistance is not just confined to highly industrialised countries and large users 
and producers of energy, but also comes from poorer consumers who are reliant upon 
affordable (often subsidised) access to energy and need to be protected from measures 
which internalise the environmental costs of energy production but generate unequal 
social impacts. 
 
8. This raises the critical question of just transitions: how to manage the shifts in 
industry, transportation, infrastructure and housing for example that are required to 
ensure patterns of energy use that are compatible with avoiding the worst effects of 
climate change. 
 
9. There are complex trade-offs and rebound effects associated with energy policy 
decision-making. Strong, participatory and transparent institutions are required to 
facilitate deliberation about policy choices and alternatives among a range of groups 
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with interests in distinct energy policy futures. This is why procedural justice is critical 
to enabling distributive justice. 
 
10. This is true not just at the national level where control over energy policy has 
traditionally resided, but also at the regional and international level where energy 
governance is either weak or non-existent. Where the energy choices of one country so 
strongly impact upon the ability of other countries to secure their own policy goals, 
higher levels of cooperation and coordination are required to meet collective energy 
needs. This includes efforts not only to steer public energy policy towards the 
fulfilment of public goods, but also to lever the vast amount of private finance that will 
be necessary to support low carbon energy infrastructures. 
 
11. The fragmented nature of global energy governance, such as it currently exists, is 
more geared towards addressing energy security in relation to price and provision of 
market information than it is towards tackling energy poverty in a sustainable way or 
enabling a shift from a fossil fuel driven global economy to one in which clean energy 
plays a much larger role. This has to change as a matter of priority. 
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